Don't forget your roots: constant-time root finding over 픽 2 m [article]

Douglas Marcelino Beppler Martins, Gustavo Banegas, Ricardo Felipe Custódio
2019 IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive  
In the last few years, post-quantum cryptography has received much attention. NIST is running a competition to select some post-quantum schemes as standard. As a consequence, implementations of post-quantum schemes have become important and with them sidechannel attacks. In this paper, we show a timing attack on a code-based scheme which was submitted to the NIST competition. This timing attack recovers secret information because of a timing variance in finding roots in a polynomial. We present
more » ... four algorithms to find roots that are protected against remote timing exploitation.
dblp:journals/iacr/MartinsBC19 fatcat:sedwcxip4vcgpfhbifhqgt3hzm