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<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/2w3awgokqne6te4nvlofavy5a4" style="color: black;">Lecture Notes in Computer Science</a>
Related-key attacks are attacks against constructions which use a secret key (such as a blockcipher) in which an attacker attempts to exploit known or chosen relationships among keys to circumvent security properties. Security against related-key attacks has been a subject of study in numerous recent cryptographic papers. However, most of these results are attacks on specific constructions, while there has been little positive progress on constructing related-key secure primitives. In this<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_16">doi:10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_16</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/wd2uryvka5debpshxp3bsm3rba">fatcat:wd2uryvka5debpshxp3bsm3rba</a> </span>
more »... , we attempt to address the question of whether relatedkey secure blockciphers can be built from traditional cryptographic primitives. We develop a theoretical framework of "related-secret secure" cryptographic primitives, a class of primitives which includes related-key secure blockciphers and PRFs. We show that while a single related-secret pseduorandom bit is sufficient and necessary to create related-key secure blockciphers, hard-core bits with typical proofs are not related-secret psuedorandom. Since the pseudorandomness of hard-core bits is the essential technique known to make pseudorandomness from assumptions of simple hardness, this presents a very strong barrier to the development of provably related-key secure blockciphers based on standard hardness assumptions.
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