A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2017; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf
.
On-Net/Off-Net Price Discrimination and 'Bill-and-Keep' vs. 'Cost-Based' Regulation of Mobile Termination Rates
2008
Social Science Research Network
This paper surveys the recent literature on competition between mobile network operators in the presence of call externalities and network effects. It shows that the regulation of mobile termination rates based on "long-run incremental costs" increases networks' strategic incentives to inefficiently set high on-net/off-net price differentials, thus harming smaller networks and new entrants. The paper argues in favor of a "bill-and-keep" system for mobile-to-mobile termination, and presents
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1374851
fatcat:hzlvjospsfba3kyhl4qrop4fy4