A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2017; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf
.
Approximating Imperfect Cryptography in a Formal Model
2004
Electronical Notes in Theoretical Computer Science
We present a formal view of cryptography that overcomes the usual assumptions of formal models for reasoning about security of computer systems, i.e. perfect cryptography and Dolev-Yao adversary model. In our framework, equivalence among formal cryptographic expressions is parameterized by a computational adversary that may exploit weaknesses of the cryptosystem to cryptanalyze ciphertext with a certain probability of success. To validate our approach, we show that in the restricted setting of
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2004.02.008
fatcat:hocbsrzffjfgzn3gvma35a5wzu