Corrupt Strategic Argumentation: The Ideal and the Naive [chapter]

Michael J. Maher
2016 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Previous work introduced a model of corruption within strategic argumentation, and showed that some forms of strategic argumentation are resistant to two forms of corruption: collusion and espionage. Such a result provides a (limited) basis on which to trust agents acting on our behalf. That work addressed several argumentation semantics, all built on the notion of admissibility. Here we continue this work to three other well-motivated semantics: the ideal, naive, and stage semantics. The
more » ... two are not admissibility-based. We show that the naive semantics does not support strategic argumentation, in the sense that the outcome of the game is determined by the initial state, if the players are not corrupt. As a result, the semantics is corruption-proof. We show that the ideal semantics is resistant to both collusion and espionage. The stage semantics is resistant to espionage, but its resistance to collusion depends on the strategic aims of the players.
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-50127-7_2 fatcat:kaitd6la6fh45cstj6wicf5u7e