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Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions and composed keys is NP-complete
2003
Theoretical Computer Science
We investigate the complexity of the protocol insecurity problem for a ÿnite number of sessions (ÿxed number of interleaved runs). We show that this problem is NP-complete with respect to a Dolev-Yao model of intruders. The result does not assume a limit on the size of messages and supports non-atomic symmetric encryption keys. We also prove that in order to build an attack with a ÿxed number of sessions the intruder needs only to forge messages of linear size, provided that they are
doi:10.1016/s0304-3975(02)00490-5
fatcat:tfob6dmzevfypogzneix5247tq