Collective revelation

Sharad Goel, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock
2009 Proceedings of the tenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '09  
Decision makers can benefit from the subjective judgment of experts. For example, estimates of disease prevalence are quite valuable, yet can be difficult to measure objectively. Useful features of mechanisms for aggregating expert opinions include the ability to: (1) incentivize participants to be truthful; (2) adjust for the fact that some experts are better informed than others; and (3) circumvent the need for objective, "ground truth" observations. Subsets of these properties are attainable
more » ... by previous elicitation methods, including proper scoring rules, prediction markets, and the Bayesian truth serum. Our mechanism of collective revelation, however, is the first to simultaneously achieve all three. Furthermore, we introduce a general technique for constructing budget-balanced mechanisms-where no net payments are made to participants-that applies both to collective revelation and to past peer-prediction methods.
doi:10.1145/1566374.1566413 dblp:conf/sigecom/GoelRP09 fatcat:ugqcm64wfjfqflgt443ba2vwgu