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Pareto optimality in coalition formation
2013
Games and Economic Behavior
A minimal requirement on allocative efficiency in the social sciences is Pareto optimality. In this paper, we identify a close structural connection between Pareto optimality and perfection that has various algorithmic consequences for coalition formation. Based on this insight, we formulate the Preference Refinement Algorithm (PRA) which computes an individually rational and Pareto optimal outcome in hedonic coalition formation games or any other discrete allocation setting. Our approach also
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.006
fatcat:eevg6uaeincrfklbcqomlpifo4