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On the Robustness of the Approximate Price of Anarchy in Generalized Congestion Games
[article]
2014
arXiv
pre-print
One of the main results shown through Roughgarden's notions of smooth games and robust price of anarchy is that, for any sum-bounded utilitarian social function, the worst-case price of anarchy of coarse correlated equilibria coincides with that of pure Nash equilibria in the class of weighted congestion games with non-negative and non-decreasing latency functions and that such a value can always be derived through the, so called, smoothness argument. We significantly extend this result by
arXiv:1412.0845v1
fatcat:tbi5eurgojchfm7wbb7dexsnzy