On the Robustness of the Approximate Price of Anarchy in Generalized Congestion Games [article]

Vittorio Bilò
2014 arXiv   pre-print
One of the main results shown through Roughgarden's notions of smooth games and robust price of anarchy is that, for any sum-bounded utilitarian social function, the worst-case price of anarchy of coarse correlated equilibria coincides with that of pure Nash equilibria in the class of weighted congestion games with non-negative and non-decreasing latency functions and that such a value can always be derived through the, so called, smoothness argument. We significantly extend this result by
more » ... ng that, for a variety of (even non-sum-bounded) utilitarian and egalitarian social functions and for a broad generalization of the class of weighted congestion games with non-negative (and possibly decreasing) latency functions, the worst-case price of anarchy of ϵ-approximate coarse correlated equilibria still coincides with that of ϵ-approximate pure Nash equilibria, for any ϵ≥ 0. As a byproduct of our proof, it also follows that such a value can always be determined by making use of the primal-dual method we introduced in a previous work. It is important to note that our scenario of investigation is beyond the scope of application of the robust price of anarchy (for as it is currently defined), so that our result seems unlikely to be alternatively proved via the smoothness framework.
arXiv:1412.0845v1 fatcat:tbi5eurgojchfm7wbb7dexsnzy