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Repayment versus Investment Conditions and Exclusivity in Lending Contracts
2011
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Repayment versus Investment Conditions and Exclusivity in Lending Contracts * Lenders condition future loans on some index of past performance. Typically, banks condition future loans on repayments of earlier obligations whilst international organizations (official lenders) condition future loans on the implementation of some policy action ('investment'). We build an agency model that accounts for these tendencies. The optimal conditionality contract depends on exclusivity -the likelihood that
doi:10.1628/093245611796589915
fatcat:mn73fprvnrdtpdmup46bo7hsem