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Two dogmas of conceptual empiricism: implications for hybrid models of the structure of knowledge
1998
Cognition
Concepts seem to consist of both an associative component based on tabulations of feature typicality and similarity judgments and an explanatory component based on rules and causal principles. However, there is much controversy about how each component functions in concept acquisition and use. Here we consider two assumptions, or dogmas, that embody this controversy and underlie much of the current cognitive science research on concepts. Dogma 1: Novel information is first processed via
doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(97)00041-3
pmid:9557380
fatcat:xe6wramwkzg4vgnjmj5bmxhut4