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Classical Misuse Attacks on NIST Round 2 PQC: The Power of Rank-Based Schemes
[article]
2020
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recently announced the public-key cryptosystems (PKC) that have passed to the second round of the post-quantum standardization process. Most of these PKC come in two flavours: a weak IND-CPA version and a strongly secure IND-CCA construction. For the weaker scheme, no level of security is claimed in the plaintext-checking attack (PCA) model. However, previous works showed that, for several NIST candidates, only a few PCA queries are
dblp:journals/iacr/Huguenin-Dumittan20
fatcat:qnvjopdgqrhq7dmdgz3kpp7uhq