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Small Coalitions Cannot Manipulate Voting
[chapter]
2005
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
We demonstrate how to make voting protocols resistant against manipulation by computationally bounded malicious voters, by extending the previous results of Conitzer and Sandholm in several important directions: we use one-way functions to close a security loophole that allowed voting officials to exert disproportionate influence on the outcome and show that our hardness results hold against a large fraction of manipulating voters (rather than a single voter). These improvements address
doi:10.1007/11507840_25
fatcat:3rms5rjidfcx7nmfesdfgbv7su