Heuristics and normative models of judgment under uncertainty

Pei Wang
1996 International Journal of Approximate Reasoning  
Psychological evidence shows that probability theory is not a proper descriptive model of intuitive human judgment. Instead, some heuristics have been proposed as such a descriptive model. This paper argues that probability theory has limitations even as a normatiue model. A new normative model of judgment under uncertainty is designed under the assumption that the system's knowledge and resources are insufficient with respect to the questions that the system needs to answer. The proposed
more » ... tics in human reasoning can also be observed in this new model, and can be justified according to the assumption. KEYWORDS: subjective probability, normative and descriptive models, heuristics and bias, insufficient knowledge and resources, nonaxiomatic reasoning system.
doi:10.1016/0888-613x(95)00091-t fatcat:t4etiifnljb3pdvlmcnz5nivse