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Heuristics and normative models of judgment under uncertainty
1996
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
Psychological evidence shows that probability theory is not a proper descriptive model of intuitive human judgment. Instead, some heuristics have been proposed as such a descriptive model. This paper argues that probability theory has limitations even as a normatiue model. A new normative model of judgment under uncertainty is designed under the assumption that the system's knowledge and resources are insufficient with respect to the questions that the system needs to answer. The proposed
doi:10.1016/0888-613x(95)00091-t
fatcat:t4etiifnljb3pdvlmcnz5nivse