Adequacy of hospitals in Rome to an unconventional event (CBRNe): TTX simulation and HTA
European Journal of Public Health
Background Rome hosts thousands of sensible targets. Healthcare reaction has been guaranteed by 6 advanced Emergency Departments (EDs) and 7 basic ones. Everyday Rome hosts 6 millions of people/die, ± 2 million in particular occasions. About National Stockpile Antidotes (SNA), Rome hosts 3 warehouses. In case of events, stockpiles are activated with a long-time call; then stockpiles are charged in delivering trucks. Methods Study analyzes PEIMAF (State of emergency plans for massive influx of
... massive influx of injures) of advanced EDs in Rome and their adequacy in a possible CBRNe attack. Hypothesis of C/N attack on Saint Peter's Square during Angelus on Wednesday (at 12.00 AM) or E attack in Trastevere on Saturday (at 9.00 PM). Analysis of activation of SNA and travel times between SNA warehouse and EDs. Comparison with French EDs during Paris attacks. Results EDs are chronically undermanned in ordinary conditions already, and would have issues in hosting a very large number of critical patients all at once. Some hospitals do not inform their workers about PEIMAF or they do not consider CBRNe emergencies in their PEIMAF, and even if it has been considered, hardly any simulation/exercitation is ever performed. Moreover, news of the CBRNe attack may not reach immediately the healthcare personal already at work in EDs; this is extremely problematic since they could be at major risk of contamination in case of CBRNe attacks. Furthermore, without a standardize protocol active in the whole city, no cross-hospital organization can be performed. Conclusions All data point towards the weakness and fragmentation of actual organizative system. Time of activation and charging are crucials for first aid efficacy and efficiency; a smart call system can reduce the activation time of SNA. A better organization of SNA in major Rome hospitals can reduce delivering time and help save more lives. Key messages Basing on our experience, we can say that all the resilience health strategies, especially when connected to terrorist/CBRNe events, should be managed by the National Government. the capability to face up these kind of events should be up to time-dependent networks, especially considering those hospitals with medium-high intensity healthcare.