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Resisting Wrongful Explanations
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
In this paper I explore a method for refusing uptake when explanations are morally and epistemically troubling. Gaile Pohlhaus Jr (2011) has shown that imploring marginalised people to "understand" marginalising practices amounts to a request that they legitimise their own marginalisation. In this paper, I expand upon this analysis with the aim of describing a method for withholding understanding. First, I analyse understanding through its association with explanation. Drawing on pragmaticdoi:10.26556/jesp.v19i2.1202 fatcat:iqmrzclbhndwpgdgtljrfk5pp4