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Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Recently, the password-authenticated key exchange protocol J-PAKE of Hao and Ryan (Workshop on Security Protocols 2008) was formally proven secure in the algebraic adversary model by Abdalla et al. (IEEE S&P 2015). In this paper, we propose and examine two variants of J-PAKE -which we call RO-J-PAKE and CRS-J-PAKE -that each makes the use of two less zero-knowledge proofs than the original protocol. We show that they are provably secure following a similar strategy to that of Abdalla et al. Wedoi:10.1007/978-3-319-39555-5_4 fatcat:rjr3mwwqpravjpxxhxrrdnpndy