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Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms
[article]
2014
arXiv
pre-print
We provide polynomial-time approximately optimal Bayesian mechanisms for makespan minimization on unrelated machines as well as for max-min fair allocations of indivisible goods, with approximation factors of 2 and {m-k+1, Õ(√(k))} respectively, matching the approximation ratios of best known polynomial-time algorithms (for max-min fairness, the latter claim is true for certain ratios of the number of goods m to people k). Our mechanisms are obtained by establishing a polynomial-time
arXiv:1405.5940v1
fatcat:ujk7ymmuebff3ol376ptrgszqm