Preface to the Focused Issue on Dynamic Games in Cyber Security

Saurabh Amin, Karl Henrik Johansson
2019 Dynamic Games and Applications  
Dynamic games offer a natural paradigm to model and analyze security of networked systems. Many game-theoretic models have been introduced in recent years to capture the strategic interactions between multiple agents or decision makers, with a focus on security and efficiency as conflicting objectives. More sophisticated models include asymmetric information or dynamically evolving network security. Realistic models that can be analyzed rigorously and offer relevant insights are needed to
more » ... s important issues such as vulnerability assessment, analysis of network security and cyber-induced failures, incentivizing investments in security, and design of mechanisms to reduce risks. To promote further research in this subject, Dynamic Games and Applications is publishing the focused issue "Dynamic Games in Cyber Security." This issue features five papers on game-theoretic models and analysis approaches for cyber and cyber-physical security of networked systems. The first paper "Dynamic Games in Cyber-Physical Security: An Overview," by Etesami and Başar, provides a comprehensive survey of the field and serves as an introduction to the special issue. The authors focus on cyber-physical security (as opposed to just cyber security) problems where dynamic interaction between the main players (i.e., attackers and defenders) is a key feature. The paper is structured around applications and topical areas so that the reader can get a broad perspective on how game theory can be applied to a range of topics in the field. Specific topics include: Network security including intrusion detection and risk assessment; Security games including signaling, deception, and Stackelberg models; Physical-layer security against jamming and eavesdropping attacks; Applications of incentive or mechanism design to security problems; Optimal resource allocation for security; and Learning algorithms for finding optimal attack and defense strategies. In their discussion of these topics, the authors include references to recent advancements and discuss key issues in the analysis of dynamic games for security problems. The second paper "An Efficient Dynamic Allocation Mechanism for Security in Networks of Interdependent Strategic Agents," by Farhadi, Tavafoghi, Teneketzis, and Golestani, contributes to the topic of incentive design in dynamic networked systems. The authors consider a model of networked system with strategic agents who have private information about their security state. Over time, the agents face security threats of outside attacks as well as from
doi:10.1007/s13235-019-00335-x fatcat:vy3uplj7aze5pjp6oiz5snnuyy