Report on the oversight assessment of the operational readiness review of the Replacement Tritium Facility at Savannah River Site [report]

B.T. Lee
1993 unpublished
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report presents the results of an oversight assessment (OA) conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) of operational readiness review (ORR) activities for the Replacement Tritium Facility (RTF) located at Savannah River Site (SRS). The EH OA of this facility took place concurrently with an ORR conducted by the DOE Office of Defense Programs (DP). The DP ORR was conducted from January 19 through February 5, 1993. The
more » ... uary 5, 1993. The EH OA was performed in accordance with the protocol and procedures specified in "EH Program for Oversight Assessment of Operational Readiness Evaluations for Startups and Restarts," dated September 15, 1992. The EH OA Team evaluated the DP ORR to determine whether it was thorough and demonstrated sufficient inquisitiveness to verify that the implementation of programs and procedures adequately ensures the protection of worker safety and health. The EH OA Team performed its evaluation of the DP ORR in the following technical areas: occupational safety, industrial hygiene, and respiratory protection; fire protection; and chemical safety. In the areas of fire protection and chemical safety, the EH OA Team conducted independent verticalslice reviews to confirm DP ORR results. Within each technical area, the EH OA Team reviewed the DP ORR Plan, including the Criteria Review and Approach Documents (CRADs); the qualifications of individual DP ORR team members; the performance of planned DP ORR activities; and the results of the DP ORR. The EH OA Team's overview and vertical-siice reviews confirmed the adequacy of the DP ORR in the above-cited worker safety areas. The EH OA Team agrees with the Findings and Observations identified by the DP ORR Team for these areas and concludes that they represent a complete list and proper categorization as either Findings or Observations. In addition, the EH OA Team identified a number of issues that were subsequently incorporated into the DP ORR review, including (1) lack of a documented pressure safety program, (2) deficiencies in carcinogen control procedures for asbestos-containing materials located in the RTF, and (3) deficiencies in the issuance and control of protective equipment. The EH OA Team identified the following Observations during this review: Observation EHOA-SRS-RTF-Ol: The CRADs lack specificity in the worker safety areas. Observation EHOA-SRS-RTF-02: Issue evaluation criteria for the DP ORR did not include consideration of matters related to worker safety. Observation EHOA-SRS-RTF-03: The DP ORR Team specific experience in the occupational safety, industrial hygiene, and chemical safety technical areas should be strengthened. Observation EH0A-SRS-RTF-04: The CRADs may not adequa-tely consider process systems that may pose hazards to workers. Observation EHOA-SRS-RTF-05: The organization of the DP ORR and the assignment of responsibilities contributed to weaknesses in the review of issues related to worker safety. Observation EHOA-SRS-RTF-06: The DP ORR report does not reflect actual facility status at the time of the review. A DOE memorandum from Peter N. Brush, Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of Environment, Safety and Health, to the Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of Defense Programs, transmitted this report and requested a DP response to the EH OA Observations. In addition, this memorandum requested that DP provide EH with documentation verifying satisfactory closure of the following DP ORR worker safety Findings: H.2-2, M.6-2, M.7-1, M.7-2, M.7-3, M.7-4, and M.7-9. B -3
doi:10.2172/6564433 fatcat:as2bdfa6jvfofcrmzqgz6ip56a