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Pessimistic Leader-Follower Equilibria with Multiple Followers
2017
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
The problem of computing the strategy to commit to has been widely investigated in the scientific literature for the case where a single-follower is present. In the multi-follower setting though, results are only sporadic. In this paper, we address the multi-follower case for normal-form games, assuming that, after observing the leader's commitment, the followers play pure strategies and reach a Nash equilibrium. We focus on the pessimistic case where, among many equilibria, one minimizing the
doi:10.24963/ijcai.2017/25
dblp:conf/ijcai/Coniglio0M17
fatcat:bvpx7cl4lrcfhmh2atxskj6zw4