Designing Checks and Balances

Dragu Tiberiu
2014 Quarterly Journal of Political Science  
for helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are ours. Abstract Essential to the Madisonian conception of checks and balances is the division of policy-making authority among multiple actors such that each can veto proposed changes in policy. We use a mechanism design approach to analyze checks and balances institutions. We show that the checks and balances institutions in which the most preferred policy of the more moderate player is the unique equilibrium outcome are the only institutions
more » ... that are strategy proof, efficient, responsive, and utility maximizing (within strategy proof institutions) under certain conditions. Although our results can serve as a normative benchmark to assess a variety of checks and balances institutions, we illustrate the applicability of our analysis within the context of constitutional review. Our paper contributes to several literatures on institutions by deriving results that hold for all possible checks and balances arrangements.
doi:10.1561/100.00013022 fatcat:7sfy2horyrhjvn6oaslqjy6prq