2 Abstract Purpose -While previous studies explored the argument that allies the notion of complexity to the complex product-service offerings being procured, this paper explores whether there is a corollary with exchange governance complexity. More specifically, the paper analyzes the relationship between systemic complexity and complexity of contractual and relational exchange governance in procuring complex performance (PCP) arrangements. Design/methodology/approach -A multiple, longitudinal

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... case study method is used to examine the relationship between systemic complexity and exchange governance complexity. The study deploys rich data sets by combining government and company reports with 43 semi-structured interviews. Findings -Preliminary conclusions suggest that as a response to increasing systemic complexity, organizations respond with increasing contractual governance complexity. However, better performing PCP arrangements illustrate that the use of simplified contractual governance in form of working agreements in combination with relational governance such as inter-personal relationships may be more effective to counteract complexity. Practical implications -The paper questions whether organizations should respond with increasing exchange governance complexity to counteract systemic complexity. Managers must consider the manageability and enforceability of complex contracts in combination with the formation of inter-personal relationships and simplified working agreements. Originality/value -This study adds to the limited empirical understanding on the nature of long-term public-private interactions in procuring complex performance. It also contributes through a rare focus on the relationship between systemic complexity and exchange governance complexity in PCP arrangements. Geraldi et al., 2011), it is the dynamic interactions between these components that give rise to complexityan emergent property that cannot be deduced from the properties of the components alone. Second, few studies have extended the complexity lens to also incorporate the governance 'regulator'. Following Ashby's (1956) 'law of requisite variety' for example, a system is only stable if the number of states of its control mechanism is greater than or equal to the number of states in the system being controlled. In other words this suggests that, when confronted with a complex situation (such as a PCP arrangement) there are two choicesincrease the variety in the regulator (i.e. 'more' contractual and relational governance with more complete and hence larger contracts, requiring more lawyers, more contract managers, more KPIs, more meetings, etc.) or reduce the variety in the system being regulated. It is these under-developed areas that shape the main focus and contribution of this paper. In addition to additive conceptual insights, the research analyzed rich (e.g. addressing both buyer and supplier perspectives) and longitudinal (i.e. investigating design, construction and operations phases) data from two case studies to help address two overall research questions: do successful PCP arrangements require complex exchange (i.e. contractual and relational) governance?; and what is the impact of exchange governance complexity on overall supply 1 The authors thank one of the anonymous reviewers for helping us to clarify this crucial insight.