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Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects
[chapter]
2013
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
We study simple item bidding mechanisms for the combinatorial public project problem and explore their efficiency guarantees in various well-known solution concepts. We first study sequential mechanisms where each agent, in sequence, reports her bid for every item in a predefined order on the agents determined by the mechanism. We show that if agents' valuations are unit-demand any subgame perfect equilibrium of a sequential mechanism achieves the optimal social welfare. For the simultaneous
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_28
fatcat:5h6d6hnmkjbnxhyeo6ah4mbu2q