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Optimal Bounds for the No-Show Paradox via SAT Solving
[article]
2016
arXiv
pre-print
Voting rules allow multiple agents to aggregate their preferences in order to reach joint decisions. Perhaps one of the most important desirable properties in this context is Condorcet-consistency, which requires that a voting rule should return an alternative that is preferred to any other alternative by some majority of voters. Another desirable property is participation, which requires that no voter should be worse off by joining an electorate. A seminal result in social choice theory by
arXiv:1602.08063v1
fatcat:wei2xrwswvcb5gehxif7phk6be