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Secure information flow with random assignment and encryption
2006
Proceedings of the fourth ACM workshop on Formal methods in security - FMSE '06
Type systems for secure information flow aim to prevent a program from leaking information from variables classified as H to variables classified as L. In this work we extend such a type system to address encryption and decryption; our intuition is that encrypting a H plaintext yields a L ciphertext. We argue that well-typed, polynomial-time programs in our system satisfy a computational probabilistic noninterference property, provided that the encryption scheme is IND-CCA secure. As a part of
doi:10.1145/1180337.1180341
dblp:conf/ccs/Smith06
fatcat:dfkqjejy5fffbo74gyclcbyosa