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Randomized instruction set emulation to disrupt binary code injection attacks
2003
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communication security - CCS '03
Binary code injection into an executing program is a common form of attack. Most current defenses against this form of attack use a 'guard all doors' strategy, trying to block the avenues by which execution can be diverted. We describe a complementary method of protection, which disrupts foreign code execution regardless of how the code is injected. A unique and private machine instruction set for each executing program would make it difficult for an outsider to design binary attack code
doi:10.1145/948109.948147
dblp:conf/ccs/BarrantesAPSZ03
fatcat:gzgwdwnlcbb3jaseeybwnvu7ua