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Holdout problems prevent decentralized aggregation of complementary goods, but the coercion required to overcome holdout may encourage abuse and violate fairness standards. We propose second-best efficiency, abuse-prevention, and fairness criteria for procedures intended to reduce holdout. Our criteria are jointly satisfied by a class of "Concordance" procedures. In these procedures, the prospective buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the group of sellers, and the sellers use andoi:10.1145/1993574.1993607 dblp:conf/sigecom/KominersW11 fatcat:u3nyb74b4fbtvdvb7vc44dplfq