On Preventing SAT Attack with Decoy Key-Inputs

Quang-Linh Nguyen, Marie-Lise Flottes, Sophie Dupuis, Bruno Rouzeyre
2021 2021 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI)  
The globalized supply chain in the semiconductor industry raises several security concerns such as IC overproduction, intellectual property piracy and design tampering. Logic locking has emerged as a Design-for-Trust countermeasure to address these issues. Original logic locking proposals provide a high degree of output corruption -i.e., errors on circuit outputsunless it is unlocked with the correct key. This is a prerequisite for making a manufactured circuit unusable without the designer's
more » ... tervention. Since the introduction of SAT-based attacks -highly efficient attacks for retrieving the correct key from an oracle and the corresponding locked design -resulting design-based countermeasures have compromised output corruption for the benefit of better resilience against such attacks. Our proposed logic locking scheme, referred to as SKG-Lock, aims to thwart SAT-based attacks while maintaining significant output corruption. The proposed provable SAT-resilience scheme is based on the novel concept of decoy key-inputs. Compared with recent related works, SKG-Lock provides higher output corruption, while having high resistance to evaluated attacks.
doi:10.1109/isvlsi51109.2021.00031 fatcat:sthe2rivlndcnoh6gmuri33me4