Detecting Sabotage Attacks in Additive Manufacturing Using Actuator Power Signatures

Jacob Gatlin, Sofia Belikovetsky, Samuel B. Moore, Yosef Solewicz, Yuval Elovici, Mark Yampolskiy
2019 IEEE Access  
Additive manufacturing (AM), a.k.a. 3D printing is increasingly used to manufacture functional parts of safety-critical systems. The AM's dependence on computerization raises the concern that the AM process can be tampered with, and a part's mechanical properties sabotaged. To address this threat, we propose a novel approach for detecting sabotage attacks based on trusted monitoring of the current delivered to each printer motor. The proposed approach offers numerous advantages: 1) it is
more » ... asive in a time-critical process, 2) it can be retrofitted in legacy systems, and 3) it can be air-gapped from the computerized components of the AM process, making simultaneous compromise more difficult. We evaluated the approach on five categories of toolpath command-level manipulations that impact the geometry of the 3D printed object. Our evaluation showed that all but one tested category of attacks can be reliably detected, even if a single toolpath command is modified. INDEX TERMS Three-dimensional printing, security, side-channel attacks, power system security, intrusion detection.
doi:10.1109/access.2019.2928005 fatcat:iaehxp4p4va5pmcdxgjkdt25cy