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Is Transparency an Anti-Corruption Myth?
2017
Social Science Research Network
We look at the effect of transparency on the incidence of costly back-scratching in a laboratory setting by implementing player identification via photographs. In our experimental design players have an incentive to form bilateral alliances in which they favour their partner at the expense of others. We find no improvement in overall group payoffs from transparency. A plausible story that fits our results is that there may be two countervailing forces at play. First, more rapid alliance
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2938162
fatcat:23idn62yhnfdfaaw2o4uqvt6xy