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Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences
[article]
2016
arXiv
pre-print
We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each agent, there is a probability distribution over linear preferences, (2) compact indifference model --- for each agent, a weak preference order is specified and each linear order compatible with the weak order is equally likely and (3) joint probability model
arXiv:1607.02917v1
fatcat:sdz2mmrjzjhg3a5azrcgamk5jq