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Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations
2002
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems part 1 - AAMAS '02
Combinatorial markets where bids can be submitted on bundles of items can be economically desirable coordination mechanisms in multiagent systems where the items exhibit complementarity and substitutability. There has been a surge of research on winner determination in combinatorial auctions. In this paper we study a wider range of combinatorial market designs: auctions, reverse auctions, and exchanges, with one or multiple units of each item, with and without free disposal. We first
doi:10.1145/544757.544760
fatcat:4n4byot4tndhlavvpr46n5fvam