Making Sense. On the Cluster significatio-intentio in Medieval and "Austrian" Philosophies
Laurent Cesalli, Claudio Majolino
2014
Méthodos
This text was automatically generated on 3 May 2019. Les contenus de la revue Methodos sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution -Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale -Pas de Modification 4.0 International. 19 Since the influence of Brentano on Marty is uncontroversial, the fact that in his Vienna lectures language appears as a deliberately crafted instrument (beabsichtigtes ausgebildetes Instrument) whose main purpose (Zweck) is to foster communication between
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... conscious beings, cannot come as a surprise 22 . However, while the idea that language is a tool ( Werkzeug) and an auxiliary (Hilfsmittel) is certainly present-although indirectly, through a quote of John St. Mill-upon closer consideration, Brentano's version of AP turns out to be different from both Marty's and Bühler's. In fact, Brentano's claim that language is an instrument whose original task is to communicate thoughts (Gedankenmitteilung), and Marty's idea that language is a set of pragmatic means to do something to the other's soul by manifesting one's own intentions, are not exactly identical. In Marty's view, communication of thoughts, even though extremely important, cannot be considered as the main task (Aufgabe) of every action involving linguistic tools. Communication is rather the distinguishing feature of a specific action: the action of using linguistic signs in order to share knowledge and thoughts. Thus, according to Marty, the term "communication" ( Mitteilung) has two meanings, a narrower and a broader one, none of them being identical with the original function of a linguistic action: "But also as a mediator of truth and knowledge language has an important task, both insofar as their communication-taken in the trivial narrow sense of the word -is concerned, i.e., [communication] taking place between different individuals; and [insofar as] what can also be called communication in a broader sense is at stake, I mean, the communication of thoughts and their contents, occurring step by step in the progress of solitary thinking, from a single individual to herself and from the present thinker to the future [thinker]" 23 . 20 As an artefact, language can be used to modify the other's mind in different ways. For example, it can deliberately be used to serve aesthetical purposes, producing in another conscious being (psychisches Wesen) "aesthetic pleasure by virtue of beautiful presentations" 24 ; likewise, it can play a crucial role in connection with the communication (Mitteilen) of information and, more generally, in order to share knowledge and evoke in the other's mind certain judgments that one holds to be true. In both cases (for instance, poetry and communication) particular human products (words, sentences, etc.) are instrumentally employed with the aim of producing certain effects in the mental life of another conscious being (like arousing certain beautiful presentations or true judgments). However, it is readily apparent that the first usage is as linguistic as the second. Hence, communication-intended precisely as the performance of a linguistic action having the function of mediating, i.e., evoking certain (allegedly) true judgments in another conscious being-cannot be conflated with the original and more general task of language itself. For, according to Marty, as we have seen, every deliberate attempt to modify someone else's life (influencing her mind and/or guiding her behaviours) by employing certain signs and manifesting our own intentions is a full-fledged act of speech. Using linguistic signs in order to communicate thoughts is therefore only one way to modify someone's intentional life (while speaking to someone in order to conjure Making Sense. On the Cluster significatio-intentio in Medieval and "Austrian"...
doi:10.4000/methodos.4068
fatcat:k6uposhcxrbc7cllbcfjw6cjli