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Attacker Control and Impact for Confidentiality and Integrity
2011
Logical Methods in Computer Science
Language-based information flow methods offer a principled way to enforce strong security properties, but enforcing noninterference is too inflexible for realistic applications. Security-typed languages have therefore introduced declassification mechanisms for relaxing confidentiality policies, and endorsement mechanisms for relaxing integrity policies. However, a continuing challenge has been to define what security is guaranteed when such mechanisms are used. This paper presents a new
doi:10.2168/lmcs-7(3:17)2011
fatcat:ondjnwnxffdkjad5d6rvinymsa