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UC Merced Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society Title Making Sense of Embodiment: Simulation Theories and the Sharing of Neural Circuitry Between Sensorimotor and Cognitive Processes Publication Date Making Sense of Embodiment: Simulation Theories and the Sharing of Neural Circuitry Between Sensorimotor and Cognitive Processes
2004
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society
unpublished
Although an increasing number of cognitive scientists are convinced that cognition is embodied, there still is relatively little agreement on what exactly that means. Notions of what it actually means for a cognizer to be embodied range from simplistic ones such as 'being physical' or 'interacting with an environment' to more demanding ones that consider a particular morphology or a living body prerequisites for embodied cognition. Based on experimental evidence from a range of disciplines, we
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