A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2017; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf
.
Trade Association Disclosure Rules, Incentives to Share Information, and Welfare
1990
The Rand Journal of Economics
In this article I propose a monopolistic competition framework to analyze the effects of different disclosure rules used by trade associations on the incentives to share information and on the welfare of consumers, firms, and society. This framework is appropriate whenever a single firm cannot irifluence aggregate market magnitudes, and serves as a benchmark for the analysis of information-pooling agreements abstracting from strategic considerations. 1 report two main results. First, a policy
doi:10.2307/2555617
fatcat:itemmcfiwfgohcgdeq3qxpziha