Towards Democratic Models of Science: Exploring the Case of Scientific Pluralism

Jeroen Van Bouwel
2015 Perspectives on Science  
Scientific pluralism, a normative endorsement of the plurality or multiplicity of research approaches in science, has recently been advocated by several philosophers (e.g., Kellert et al. 2006 , Kitcher 2001 , Longino 2013 , Mitchell 2009 , and Chang 2010 . Comparing these accounts of scientific pluralism, one will encounter quite some variation. We want to clarify the different interpretations of scientific pluralism by showing how they incarnate different models of democracy, stipulating the
more » ... esired interaction among the plurality of research approaches in different ways. Introducing scientific pluralism. Studying the actual practice of science, we come across many instances in which scientists analyzing one and the same phenomenon, for instance, aggressive behavior, provide us with very different explanations of the phenomenon using different (seemingly) irreconcilable approaches, i.e. behavioral genetics (molecular or quantitative), social-environmental approaches (behavioral dispositions of socialization patterns, familial environments, and/or parental attitudes and interactions with their children), neurobiology (physiology and anatomy -the neural substrate of behavior) or the developmental systems approach (cf. Longino 2006 Longino , 2013 . One finds similar situations in biology, for instance, the alternative models of predator-prey dynamics in population biology, in economics, think about the explanations given for the financial crisis, in physics, e.g., in quantum dynamics (cf. Dickson 2006), or, in chemistry (cf. Chang 2012. This raises the question of how to deal with this multiplicity of explanations, theories, models, research approaches, classificatory schemes, knowledge systems, ... in science. Scientific pluralists endorse this multiplicity and consider it to be beneficial -and this holds for various possible views about the aim of science. If the aim of science is taken to be Truth, the main argument for pluralism is based on the unpredictability of scientific development -since we do not know which line of inquiry will be ultimately successful, it makes sense to cultivate various lines. If the main aim of science is empirical adequacy or understanding, there are further arguments for pluralism because different systems of knowledge can contribute to the aim in different ways. If we regard science to have various aims simultaneously, then there are even further pluralist arguments (cf. Chang, 2010). Thus, while earlier philosophers of science were mostly pondering over how to identify the best theory, method and/or approach in science presuming scientific monism, the pluralist philosophers consider the viability of the view that phenomena might require multiple accounts -as the serious study of actual scientific practice teaches them-and they advocate scientific pluralism. In a very general way, one could define this scientific pluralism as a normative endorsement of the multiplicity of knowledge systemstheories, models or research approaches -in each area of science. It is contrasted with scientific monism that evaluates approaches on the basis of whether they can provide a single, comprehensive and complete account of phenomena. Rather than developing methods to select or justify the one best knowledge system or research approach, pluralist philosophers chew over how to deal with the multiplicity of knowledge systems; how they (should) interact, how this interaction can be made as productive as possible, what it requires from the scientist to operate in a pluralistic mode, how to choose a knowledge system to deal with a specific problem, etc. However, hovering over the current literature on plurality in science, we can only conclude that the answers to these questions diverge a lot. To give you a hint of the variety of scientific "pluralisms", compare: "integrative pluralism" contrasted with "isolationist pluralism" (Mitchell 2009), "perspectival pluralism" (Giere 2006), "theoretical pluralism" (Longino 2006) and "ineliminable pluralism" (Longino
doi:10.1162/posc_a_00165 fatcat:72bogmxssrcc3brwxgj5vtg5aa