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Proof-Oriented Design of a Separation Kernel with Minimal Trusted Computing Base
2019
Electronic Communications of the EASST
The development of provably secure OS kernels represents a fundamental step in the creation of safe and secure systems. To this aim, we propose the notion of protokernel and an implementation — the Pip protokernel — as a separation kernel whose trusted computing base is reduced to its bare bones, essentially providing separation of tasks in memory, on top of which non-influence can be proved. This proof-oriented design allows us to formally prove separation properties on a concrete executable
doi:10.14279/tuj.eceasst.76.1080
dblp:journals/eceasst/JomaaTNGH18
fatcat:ozmsdi775bgtdfnwiutuvusn3i