Contextualism, skepticism, and invariantism DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n3p375

Stephen Jacobson
2011 Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology  
Michael Williams and Keith DeRose defend their different versions of contextualism on the grounds that contextualism gives a better account of the ordinary use of epistemic terms than invariantist competitors. One aim of this paper is to explain why their arguments do not succeed. A further aim is to show that the dispute between contextualists and invariantists portrayed by Williams and DeRose is a narrow interpretation of the dispute: there are important contextualist and invariantist
more » ... s which fall outside the scope of their arguments and which a full defense of contextualism should consider.
doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n3p375 fatcat:bdof4crxevbidacrxqkxkzk4o4