I14 SCIENCE. even the vapots of elementary bodies, including the eleothers is; one of the instincts which is as universal in men'ary gases, when more stricly examined, will be Man as the desire of communicating. knowledge. Both found capable of producing sounds. aIre indeed branches of the same stem-off-shoots from thle same root. The acquisition of knowledge. to which we are stimuilated by the instinctive affi9ctions ofl curi-THE UNITY OF NATURE. ositv and of wonder, is one of the greate-st of

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... human BY THiE DuKE-OF ARGYLL. pleasures, and the desire we have to comnmunicate our VI~~~~~~~knowled-.,e to others is the great motive-force on which its progress and accumulation depend. The pleasure (C'ontinu~edfro'ntpage~I03.) which all men take, when their disposi-tions are good, ON THE MIORAL CHARACT-ER OF 'MAN, CONSIDERED IN in sharingT with others their own enjoyments, is ancther THE LIGHT OF THE UNITY OF NATURE. feature quiite as markedi andi quite as innate in the character of Man. And if there is; aniy course of action to In dealing with this quesl ion, it is a comfort to remem-whichi we do instinctively attachi the sentime_nt of moral ber that we are in possession of analogies de-ply seated Iapprobation, it is that 'course of action which assumes in the constitution and in the course of Nature. It is that our own desires, and our owvn estimates of good, quite possible to assign to Intuition or to Instinct the and the standlard by which we ought to jud(ge of what is place and rank wvh!ch really btlongs to it, and to assigrn clue to andi is desiredi by otlhers. The soci-al instinicts.of also to what is called Experience the functions wvhichi are our nattire must, therefore, naturally andi intuitively in. unque;tioniThly its own. Therec is no sense or faiculty of dicate benevolence as a virtuous, and malevolence as the mindi whiich does not gain by educ-tion--not oie a vicious disposition ; and, again, ouir knowledge of which is indep)en(dent of thiose processt's of (develol)ment what is benievolent and wvhat is malevolent is involved which result fr-om its Contact with the external wvorld. in ouir owni instinctive sense oif whvat to uis is gzood, and But neither is ithere axnv sense or faculty of the mind of' whlat to uis is evil, It is quiite truie thiat thl;s sense which starts unfOrnishlc wvith somie onie cr miote of' thiose-may he compamrativelv low~or hh,and( crinsequ-nitly thlat intuitive percelptioni withi wvhich all e(lucationi and( all the stan(l irdl of oblig-ation which is foundedt( upon it miay development must begin. just as every exetcise of rca-be elemienitary and( nothingi( miore. Those whoseI owvn son must be founded on certain axiomns which are self-(lesires are fe'w and rudle, and( w~host own estimai-tes of evidtent to the logical facultv, so all othier exerciFes of the good are very limited, miust of course form an es;timate mind must start from the dlirect perr catoion of sonic rudicorrespondingly poor andi scant of wvhat is goodI for, and mentary truths. It wouldI he strangec indeedI if the mioral of whait is d~'esiredl by, others.. But this exactly corfaculty wecre any excep)tion to this fundamental laxv responds with thle f,icts' of humani nature. Thlis is pre-This faculty in its highier cond(itions, suchi as we~see it in cisely the variety of uniity which its phenomena pres;ent. the best inca in the miost highly civilizedI commtiunilties, [h'lere are no mieni of sa-ne mnind in whiomi tI'e Moral may stan(l at ani incafluWlal disiaancr fi-omi its earliest and Sense (lues not exiQt -,tha-t is to say, thlere are nio mien simplest coni(iioni, and still miore fromi its lowest condiw ho (10 not attach to somie actionis or other the Fentition, such as we set it in the moist dle'radled races of ment of app,roval, and to somie other actions the oppo-