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How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures
2010
Games and Economic Behavior
We study the question of how long it takes players to reach a Nash equilibrium in uncoupled setups, where each player initially knows only his own payoff function. We derive lower bounds on the communication complexity of reaching a Nash equilibrium, i.e., on the number of bits that need to be transmitted, and thus also on the required number of steps. Specifically, we show lower bounds that are exponential in the number of players in each one of the following cases: (1) reaching a pure Nash
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.002
fatcat:xeqrst7hazbyrg6islro2m5epm