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Lecture Notes in Computer Science
This paper points out: (i) a possibility for malicious selection of the LFSRs feedback polynomials in order to install a trap-door for the cryptanalysis; and (ii) a weakness of the construction of the resilient functions over GF(q) proposed at CRYPTO'96. Two corresponding methods for cryptanalysis are proposed. It is shown that although certain keystream generators over GF(q) are resistant against correlation and linear complexity based attacks, they are vulnerable by some novel attacks. Thedoi:10.1007/3-540-36492-7_14 fatcat:xcd3ezmpyvfxxnfduj5xhijzoy