Global Justice and Poverty Relief in Nonideal Circumstances

Pablo Gilabert
2008 Social Theory and Practice  
This paper explores the problem of how to think about the fulfillment of an (idealtheoretical) conception of basic global justice demanding the eradication of global poverty given the recognition of two facts (or nonideal circumstances): (a) the absence of robust international institutions and (b) the lack of a strong ethos of cosmopolitan solidarity. 1 The paper has three parts. Section II presents an account of central concepts involved in the discussion of global justice (such as basic and
more » ... nbasic global justice, ideal and nonideal theory, and the different dimensions of a political conception and their justification). Section III clarifies the exact relevance of (a) and (b) for a theory of basic global justice. I argue that it is a mistake to think that a recognition of (a) and (b) justifies the claim that there are no stringent duties of justice regarding the eradication of global poverty. Institutional structures and motivational mechanisms should track basic normative principles, not the other way around. What a recognition of (a) and (b) provides is, instead, grounds for demanding serious consideration of nonideal issues of practical feasibility affecting the precise articulation and practical implementation of such principles. The final section of the paper advances some positive suggestions as to how to move the theoretical and practical agenda of global justice and poverty relief forward with respect to the problems of feasibility identified in section III. I argue, first, that discussion in political philosophy regarding issues of global justice should take what I will call a transitional standpoint. This is the standpoint of political agents that are in the process of changing central features of the institutional and cultural environment in which they act. A transitional standpoint focuses on the identification of dynamic trajectories of political action, which set into motion a 2 sequence of political reforms that passes through successive thresholds of feasibility. This approach is sensitive to both idealtheoretical and nonidealtheoretical considerations. Second, I provide an illustration of this approach regarding poverty relief in the face of (a) and (b) by discussing the central importance of agents' political empowerment through dynamic practices of public deliberation, protest and institutional experimentation. II. BASIC GLOBAL JUSTICE AND NONIDEAL THEORY To be fully defensible, a political conception must propose principles, institutions and strategies of reform that are both morally desirable and practically feasible. 2 It is, however, not always clear how considerations of moral desirability and practical feasibility operate in the development and evaluation of the different dimensions of a political conception. I present, in II.1, a general account of the role of these notions, and apply it, in II.2, to the domain of discussions on global justice. II.1. Moral desirability and practical feasibility in the development and assessment of political conceptions (i) Dimensions of a political conception and their justification. Considerations of moral desirability and practical feasibility apply to three central dimensions of a political conception. The following chart may be useful for the discussion that follows. Kinds of justification Dimensions of a political conception Kinds of theory Abstract DI. Fundamental principles Ideal theory moral Initial DII. Institutional schemes Full political implementing principles from DI political DIII. Processes of reform Nonideal theory leading to realization of schemes from DII Dimension DI includes a set of fundamental principles. These principles identify the most general kinds of rights and duties that individuals in a just society have. Their defense involves 3 appeal to fundamental moral ideas and the identification of general facts that make their application practically necessary and possible. Take, for example, the two principles of Rawls's theory of "justice as fairness," the first demanding a set of equal civil and political liberties and the second demanding economic schemes that work to the greatest benefit of the worstoff on the basis of fair equality of opportunity. 3 These principles are defended as morally desirable by appeal to fundamental normative views of persons as free and equal, rational and reasonable cooperators, and are seen as practically feasible by noting that people have the moral powers and general capacities, and the need, to effectively address unavoidable facts of moderate material scarcity and conflict of interests arising in their social life (what Rawls calls the "circumstances of justice"). 4 Dimension DII involves the identification and defense of certain institutional schemes implementing the principles provided in DI. While a fundamental principle is defended by showing that it is better than the alternatives in catering to fundamental moral ideas when dealing with the most general facts of human social existence, an institutional scheme is defended by showing that it is better than the alternatives in implementing the fundamental principles selected in DI. Considerations of practical feasibility and moral desirability operate here through the operation of two filters. The first (regarding feasibility) distinguishes between sustainable or stable and unsustainable or unstable institutional schemes. An institutional scheme is sustainable or stable when its continued presence is not incompatible with general empirical truths about how people are or can be in their social life. The second filter identifies morally optimal institutional schemes. An institutional scheme is morally optimal when it is better than the alternatives at implementing the principles from DI. 5 What I will call the initial political justification of a political conception consists in showing, for a certain context, that the schemes 4 it proposes pass the two filters (i.e. that they are the morally optimal ones among those sustainable). Thus, in the case of his principles of justice, Rawls thinks that their best institutional implementation in a contemporary society would be through the institutions of either a "propertyowning democracy" or a "liberal democratic socialism," not through the institutions of a "welfare state capitalism" or a "laissezfaire capitalism." Even though the latter might be sustainable, they would not, as the former, provide the best feasible instantiation of the demands of political freedom and economic equality. 6 A third dimension of a political conception, DIII, is focused on identifying and defending strategies of political reform leading to the realization of the institutional schemes from DII when these are not in place. Again two filters concerning feasibility and desirability operate here. The first distinguishes between accessible and inaccessible institutional schemes. Following Buchanan, we can see an ideal conception of justice as accessible to certain agents when "there is a practicable route from where [they] are now to at least a reasonable approximation of the state of affairs that satisfies its principles". 7 This means that institutional schemes satisfying the fundamental principles of justice can realistically be reached by agents in a certain context. Accessibility can thus be seen as a more contextspecific form of feasibility. The second filter identifies morally optimal reforms. These are the ones which, when compared to the alternatives, are the best at approximating the realization of the just schemes while imposing acceptable moral costs to those affected. The second filter demands, in fact, a double moral test. It tests reforms for the moral value of both their results and the process leading to those results. To use the helpful terminology proposed by Amartya Sen, we are here dealing with the assessment of "comprehensive outcomes". 8 Political judgment is always needed to determine the optimal balance between processrelated and resultrelated considerations. The ideals and principles from 5 DI normally provide guidelines with which this can be done. Returning to the example of Rawls's conception of social justice, reforms introducing egalitarian economic schemes might not be appropriate if they involve tampering with people's civil and political rights (which have, according to Rawls, priority over economic ones). The full political justification of a political conception would then involve not only the proposal and defense of certain fundamental principles and institutional schemes, but also the exploration and defense of political strategies through which the latter can realistically be accessed. 9 Three comments about this account are necessary. First, it sees both considerations of practical feasibility and of moral desirability as crucial. Demanding considerations of moral desirability are necessary if a political conception is to avoid a cynical realism that fails to criticize existing or possible social injustice. Considerations of feasibility are also necessary if a political conception is to avoid the impotent idealism of merely extending injunctions that are likely not going to be fulfilled. Second, the account presented here does not conflate feasibility and desirability. The following two claims are perfectly consistent: 1. The institutional scheme S1 is just. 2. S1 is infeasible. The truth of (2) does not entail the falsity of (1). S1 may not be accessible or sustainable in a certain context. This does not make S1 unjust. We can still see S1 as just while noticing, with regret, that we cannot realistically expect to have it. Another scheme S2 may be, on the other hand, feasible but not just. Normative political argument looks for the intersection between moral desirability and feasibility, without conflating the two. These considerations certainly apply to DIII: a reform may successfully lead to a just scheme (and thus render the latter accessible) and yet be morally unacceptable (due to high moral costs involved in the process). 10 6 Notice, finally, that as we move from DI to DII to DIII considerations of practical feasibility become more contextspecific and involve a greater deal of contingency and uncertainty. The relevant empirical considerations involved in the defense of a strategy of reform are more specific than the ones involved in the defense of institutional schemes, and the latter are more specific than the very general empirical assumptions backing the proposal of fundamental principles of justice. Accurate claims about what people can realistically be expected to do depend not only on general facts about human psychology and social organization, but on the specific ways in which these operate in different cultural and institutional settings. This makes the notion of practical feasibility imprecise and malleable. This imprecision is frustrating, and the philosopher has the natural tendency to seek to eliminate it by stipulating a more precise definition. But it is important to recognize that there are strong intuitions pulling in different directions here. Both have significant bearing on the idea of responsible moral and political judgment, but they construe the obviously correct dictum "Ought implies can" in different ways. The first intuition leads to a very minimal definition of practical feasibility in terms of logical and physical possibility. This view clears the path for morally desirable action in the face of seemingly fixed social obstacles. Political history shows that indeed there are moments in which political agents (including, in particular, inspired leaders) reshape and correct perceptions of what is politically possible by pursuing ambitious projects which turn out to be realizable despite initial general dismissal. The second intuition leads to an expansive definition in terms of historical possibility rooted in contextually specific psychological and social mechanisms. This view is supported by sobering experiences of voluntaristic plans of action that fail in the face of strong psychological and social tendencies. Now, while an expansive definition of feasibility may lead to conservative narrowness, a 7 minimal one may lead to voluntarism and wishful thinking. Responsible moral and political judgment needs to steer clear of both. But there is no obvious way to do it. And this, I think, is what makes the clarification and use of the notion of practical feasibility murky and malleable. It is important, however, to notice that attention to specific social and psychological mechanisms need not be paired with conservative narrowness. Identifying mechanisms that stand in the way of the realization of normative demands, and mechanisms that foster their realization, may be seen as equally relevant for critically lucid moral and political judgment. This point will be important for the argument that follows, and I will explore it in more detail as we proceed. (ii) Temporal variation and transitional standpoint. Contextual considerations of feasibility loom particularly large in DIII. It is important to notice that these considerations may involve temporal variation and be significantly agentdependent. Imagine the following scenario: (a) a certain scheme S2 is considerably more morally desirable than another S1; (b) S2 is accessible in a context C2 but not in C1; (c) we are, here and now, in C1, not C2; (d) S1 is accessible in C1; and (e) S1 is very likely to generate C2. If (a)(e) are true, and the moves to S1 and from S1 to S2 do not involve unacceptable moral costs, then it makes sense to say that we have a duty of justice to pursue the trajectory of reform leading to S1 in C1 and from S1 to S2 in C2. Notice that the second segment in the trajectory contributes to the justification of the first, and that the trajectory involves making feasible (accessible), at a later time, what may not be feasible (accessible) here and now. What I will call a transitional standpoint focuses on precisely this kind of scenario where we can envisage temporal variation of conditions of feasibility through our political action. An important feature of political action and thought is that some conditions of feasibility can be not only found, but also made by us. The domains of practical feasibility can be shaped historically, and moral reasons may spur action to move social history beyond the 8 bounds of current injustices. The intersection between moral desirability and practical feasibility is thus best seen as a moving target. 11 II.2. Basic global justice and nonideal theory Dimensions DI and DII make up the domain of ideal theory, including both moral desirability and feasibility considerations. DIII belongs to nonideal theory. Nonideal theory tells us how to respond to injustice, how to reframe our political world in order to approximate the realization of the conditions identified by ideal theory. In what follows I consider the application of these notions to current debates on global justice. I will do this through a partially critical discussion of the deployment of the notions of ideal and nonideal theory as introduced by Rawls. (i) Ideal and nonideal theory. Rawls has coined the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory. He refers to two features of an ideal theory: (a) it assumes strict or general compliance with its demands, under favorable circumstances; and (b) it presents a picture of "what a perfectly just society would look like". 12 I think that (a) and (b) need not, however, go together. General compliance under favorable circumstances can be seen as relative to the norms of a perfectly just society or as relative to the norms of a less than perfectly just society. I suggest that we distinguish between two senses of ideal theory. Though both involve condition (a), they differ with respect to (b). The first, maximalist sense, tracks the distinction between perfectly and nonperfectly just social worlds. The second, nonmaximalist sense tracks social worlds which involve improvements in terms of justice but does not assume that they exhaust the range of desirable moral achievements. According this second view, (b) is not a necessary condition for something to be an ideal theory. What makes a theory ideal is that it points beyond actual social settings, toward morally more desirable ones. Whether the latter are ones with respect to which no moral improvements are possible is a separate (though not 9 unimportant) matter. This distinction has important consequences for moral and political judgment, as we may have sufficient certainty that an ideal theory T1 involves morally important and practically feasible improvements with respect to our current social world even if we are uncertain as to whether another ideal theory T2, which presents morally more demanding (and perhaps perfectly just) social arrangements is really sustainable or accessible. Keeping the two senses of ideal theory separate is important when we move to considerations of global justice. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls presents, as an ideal theory of international justice, a set of principles and institutional schemes that fall significantly short of what a global liberal egalitarianism would demand. Rawls does not think his two principles of social justice should apply globally. He thinks, for example, that the only principle of international redistribution would be a "duty of assistance" on the part of wellordered liberal and "nonliberal decent societies" to help burdened societies to achieve conditions making it possible for them to become wellordered. 13 An important reason why Rawls's picture of international justice is weaker than his picture of domestic justice is that he thinks that an ideal theory must be a "realistic utopia." A realistic utopia advances a conception of justice which "extends what are ordinarily thought to be the limits of practicable possibility" (it is utopian), while also making sure that the institutional schemes proposed are likely to be "stable" and "workable" (it is realistic). 14 A global extension of the principles of domestic liberal justice would, according to Rawls, be utopian without also being realistic. A realistic utopia tracks considerations of practical feasibility no less than considerations of moral desirability. Rawls recognizes, however, that identifying realistic utopian principles and schemes is not simple: I recognize that there are questions about how the limits of the practically possible are discerned and what the conditions of our social world in fact are. The problem here is that the limits of the possible 10 are not given by the actual, for we can to a greater or lesser extent change political and social institutions and much else. Hence we have to rely on conjecture and speculation, arguing as best we can that the social world we envision is feasible and might actually arise, if not now then at some future time under happier circumstances. 15 A natural question then is whether Rawls's conception of international justice really presents a maximalist ideal theory. Perhaps the "conjectures" and "speculations" he relies on are not sufficient for dismissing a more demanding cosmopolitan egalitarian account of distributive justice. For all we know (which is very little), the social world envisaged by the latter "might actually arise, if not now then at some future time under happier circumstances." 16 Rawls says that "the specific conditions of our world at any time-the status quo-do not determine the ideal conception" of international justice we must endorse but do, instead, "affect the specific answers to the questions of nonideal theory". 17 This seems correct. But it is not clear that aspects of the status quo do not creep into Rawls's ideal theory of international justice, with its flat rejection of global egalitarianism. One could also see aspects of the program of The Law of Peoples as an initial move in the development of a more radical ideal theory of global justice. The latter would be cosmopolitan, and would include something like Rawls's Law of Peoples (pace Rawls) as an initial step in a longer, ultimately more demanding, trajectory of reforms.
doi:10.5840/soctheorpract200834324 fatcat:iqshk2seczbarcm26w72d37c3q