Matter and selfhood in Kant's physics: a contemporary reappraisal [chapter]

Nicolás F. Lori, Paulo Jesus
Relations of the self  
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more » ... partir de um endereço de IP da instituição detentora da supramencionada licença. Ao utilizador é apenas permitido o descarregamento para uso pessoal, pelo que o emprego do(s) título(s) descarregado(s) para outro fim, designadamente comercial, carece de autorização do respetivo autor ou editor da obra. Na medida em que todas as obras da UC Digitalis se encontram protegidas pelo Código do Direito de Autor e Direitos Conexos e demais legislação aplicável, toda a cópia, parcial ou total, deste documento, nos casos em que é legalmente admitida, deverá conter ou fazer-se acompanhar por este aviso. The son of Werner Heisenberg and nephew-in-law of Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, the neurobiologist Martin Heisenberg 2 , who has worked extensively on the neurogenetics of Drosophila, has recently proposed that quantum physics and behavioral biology can solve the Kantian third antinomy in which Reason (Vernunft) appears to be hostage of an insurmountable conflict with itself concerning the contradictory coexistence of two types of causality, namely "causality in accordance with laws of nature" and "causality through freedom" (A444/B472 ff.) 3 . To be sure, the novelty of Heisenberg's proposal does not reside in the idea that the third antinomy is solvable, since for Kant the antinomy is nothing but an illusory contradiction that can be easily "dismantled" and avoided by distinguishing appearances or phenomena (mere representations) that are embedded in an empirically conditioned series in time and space from things in themselves whose intelligible being is situated outside any sensible conditions and enjoys total inde-pendence of all empirical laws. Thus, for him, if the Antinomy is truly understood, then its antinomic structure is dissolved. Indeed, Kant admits that both the realm of empirical causality, which guarantees the unity of experience, i.e. a necessary chain of time-determined occurrences, and the realm of intelligible causality, which constitutes the power of beginning an original action from oneself, can coexist effectively, although in different levels of reality as it were. Both models of causality are "true at the same time but in a different relation". By using this strategy of differentiation within cognitive functions, between what is determinable by another being (inside temporal relationships as a cause that is, in indefinitum, an effect of a previous cause) and self-determining (outside temporal constraints as a cause that produces itself ab ovo), Kant acknowledges the true effectiveness of the privileged but unknown level of being-in-itself whose key feature is spontaneity -the thing that appears in time and space but remains beyond its appearing. However, under a Kantian
doi:10.14195/978-989-26-0205-9_13 fatcat:sezz2prlpvff7azsfr7mz73wum