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Motivated by inconsistent, underspecified, or otherwise problematic theories and usages of social agency in the HRI literature, and leveraging philosophical work on moral agency, we present a theory of social agency wherein a social agent (a thing with social agency) is any agent capable of social action at some level of abstraction. Like previous theorists, we conceptualize agency as determined by the criteria of interactivity, autonomy, and adaptability. We use the concept of face fromdoi:10.3389/frobt.2021.687726 pmid:34485389 pmcid:PMC8414548 fatcat:3tw44x3gszf35j6zseiwxpfwiu