The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability

Eyal Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan
2003 Economic Theory  
The Borda rule is known to be the least vulnerable scoring rule to Condorcet inconsistency, Saari (2000). Such inconsistency occurs when the Condorcet winner (the alternative which is preferred to any other alternative by a simple majority) is not selected by the Borda rule. This note exposes the relationship between the Borda rule and the Condorcet q-majority principle as well as the Condorcet q-majority voting rule. The main result establishes that the Borda rule is Condorcet q-majority
more » ... tent when where k is the number of alternatives. The second result establishes that is the minimal degree of majority decisiveness corresponding to the Borda rule under sincere voting. The same majority is required to ensure decisiveness under the Borda rule and to ensure that a qrule (the generalized q-majority Condorcet rule) is a voting rule.
doi:10.1007/s00199-002-0318-3 fatcat:r253vmidtrarxjr62xaiweemki