Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking

Michel Balinski, Andrew Jennings, Rida Laraki
2009 Economics Letters  
Borda a proposé une méthode qui attribue des points à chacun des m candidats. Condorcet a proposé une méthode qui attribue des points à chacun des différents m! classements des candidats. La première est plus appropriée pour élire. La seconde est plus appropriée pour classer. Chacune satisfait une certaine monotonie. Leurs monotonies sont incompatibles. Abstract: Borda proposed a method that assigns points to each of the m candidates. Condorcet proposed a method that assigns points to each of
more » ... e m! rankings of candidates. The first is more appropriate for electing, the second is more appropriate for ranking. Each satisfies a different type of monotonicity. These monotonicities are incompatible. Abstract Borda proposed a method that assigns points to each of the m candidates. Condorcet proposed a method that assigns points to each of the m! rankings of candidates. The first is more appropriate for electing, the second is more appropriate for ranking. Each satisfies a different type of monotonicity. These monotonicities are incompatible. * This work started during the visit of Andrew Jennings to the Ecole Polytechnique in 2008 and was partially supported by G.I.S. Sciences de la Décision. 1 Note that there are m! rankings. 2 This is the same rule suggested independently by John Kemeny [6] .
doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2009.06.024 fatcat:wfumw4tuond6fjspgvlj5dosri