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Eavesdropping and countermeasures for backflash side channel in quantum cryptography
2018
Optics Express
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information theoretic secure key as long as the device performs as assumed in the theoretical model. One of the assumptions is an absence of information leakage about individual photon detection outcomes of the receiver unit. Here we investigate the information leakage from a QKD receiver due to photon emission caused by detection events in single-photon detectors (backflash). We test commercial silicon avalanche photodiodes and a photomultiplier tube,
doi:10.1364/oe.26.021020
pmid:30119408
fatcat:lnchvx6yfrelbelzjieqwtxm6a