Logic and Intensionality DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111

Guido Imaguire
2011 Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology  
There are different ways we use the expressions "extension" and "intension". I specify in the first part of this paper two basic senses of this distinction, and try to show that the old metaphysical sense, by means of particular instance vs. universal, is more fundamental than the contemporary sense by means of substitutivity. In the second part, I argue that logic in general is essentially intensional, not only because logic is a rule-guided activity, but because even the extensional
more » ... of a logic system presupposes an intensional notion of logical consequence.
doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n1p111 fatcat:kgzysukpxbbrblq3xtk2fbk4zi